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THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF LAW AND SCIENCE
PAUL L. Kum*
TRADITIONALLY, law and science have had little in common. They de-
veloped as a result of different social and intellectual needs; their view-
points and philosophies have deviated in significant ways and their practices
have had little similarity. It is not suprising that common interest and aim
have been slow in developing, and that mutual understanding has often been
lacking.
However, there has always been a philosophical bond between the two pro-
fessions of science and the law, rarely recognized, but present nonetheless.
To both, logic and fact are of primary concern. The attorney who is unusually
effective in the courtroom may still find himself at a loss if the demonstrable
facts are not favorable or are missing. The scientist also, who lacks factual
backing for his theory is unlikely to generate acceptance. There are differences
in the manner of application of logic in the two professions of science and the
law, with statistical inference and degree of proof both being treated somewhat
differently.' In science, we still speak of the atomic theory, and long before the
existence of atoms was positively proved, all scientists accepted the theory as
fundamentally correct. During this period, the attorney might well have argued
that in the absence of absolute proof, the existence of atoms was speculative.
Thus, while logic may not have equal connotation in the two professional disci-
plines, both use it and depend on it. Perhaps the difference in the two attitudes
is similar to that between preponderance of evidence, and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
There was a time when the law was based on concepts and practices that
would not be uniformly acceptable today. In these early times, science was
essentially nonexistent as a cultural force. The law assumed ethical and moral
significance long before science became an important factor in ordinary living.
With the later, vigorous scientific and technological progress, the law and
science inevitably developed more areas of overlapping concern, in line with
the alterations produced by science in every other phase of modern life.
With the automobile came the automobile accident that required legal
consideration of liability. With industry came patent litigation, industrial acci-
dents, and other matters of legal interest. With improved transportation, com-
munication and the means for committing crimes, came the more elaborate
crime that made necessary its interpretation in terms of basic physical and
chemical technology. The merging of science with the law became inevitable
and necessary.
* Professor of Criminalistics, School of Criminology, University of California. A.B.
1924, Ohio State University; M.S. 1925, University of Pittsburgh; Ph.D. 1927, University
of California.
1. For a more definitive discussion of some of the implications of these differences, the
reader is referred to McElrath & Bearman, Scientific Method, Statistical Inference, and the
Law, 1956 Science 589.
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With different approaches, philosophies and methods, it is truly remarkable
that so much blending of science with the law has already occurred. However,
there remains the problem of educating the attorney in the proper role of science
in legal practice, and of educating the scientist who becomes an expert witness
in his relation to the law. The answers to this problem are not simple, and
progress is still slow.
The professional discipline that has most effectively joined science with
the law is termed criminalistics,2 sometimes forensic science. Criminalistics has
been defined as that profession and scientific discipline directed to the recognition,
identification, individualization and interpretation of physical evidence through
application of the natural sciences to law and science matters. The important
term in this definition is "scientific discipline." It is as much a discipline in
its own right as is medicine, which also is n6t chemistry, not biology, not physics,
but a fusion of all three, modified and adapted to a specific purpose, the treat-
ment of disease in human beings. In the same way, criminalistics includes all
of these and some other sciences such as botany and mineralogy, and selects
from all of them portions that may be utilized in interpreting events of legal
significance, whether criminal or civil. Criminalistics is science, and science
must be introduced into the courtroom by scientists. It is not a conglomeration
of techniques, but a separate philosophy and practice not duplicated by any
other science or occupation. Although commonly heard, the word "technician"
is not applicable to its practice, because the technician merely follows prescribed
routines, and is not expected to understand their underlying fundamentals. He
knows how, but not why.
The difficulties encountered by the attorney in dealing with the expert
witness stem largely from the above considerations. 8 He may not realize that
a chemist is not able to solve every chemical problem, and may hire as an
expert a person who is highly competent in a limited area of chemistry, and
at the same time lacks investigative knowledge or experience. For example,
the paint chemist blends and tests paints for their protective or decorative
qualities, and may know the ramifications of various admixtures of vehicle and
pigment combinations-but, he almost certainly has never identified a paint
chip as to its origin, because this is not a normal function of a paint chemist.
It is, however, a very important part of the knowledge of the criminalist, even
if he has never blended a paint in his life. Thus, it is surprising if the paint
chemist is a suitable expert for testimony regarding paint identification.
Above all, the criminalist is a specialist in identification and determination
of the source of evidence items. It is not very important what type of evidence
2. Cf. Kirk, Criminalistics, 1963 Science 367; Kirk, The Ontogeny of Criminalistics,
54 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 235 (1963).
3. The utilization of chemists as experts has been discussed more extensively in Science
Aids Law Enforcement, 32 Chemical & Engineering News 4936 (1954); Chemists in Court,
32 Chemical & Engineering News 5046 (1954). See also Expert Witness, Industrial &
Engineering Chemistry, August, 1954, p. 25A.
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is involved because the principles of identification are universally applicable
and the approaches to determining the source, or individualization, apply to
all types of evidence. It is this distinction, between the identification specialist,
and the specialist in industrial, or medical, or commercial aspects of a particular
type of evidence, that is least understood by the attorney.
In further analysis of this distinction, it may be useful to compare the
identification of handwriting with the identification of a firearm that has fired
a particular bullet. Most attorneys would not consider them analogous in any
respect and would employ a document examiner and a firearms expert respect-
ively. While this may sometimes be necessary, consider the following facts: The
writer leaves marks on paper, which are never precisely duplicated in any two
samples, but which always carry certain features determined by his individual
writing habits. On the other hand, the firearm leaves marks on a bullet, which are
never precisely duplicated on any two successive firings, but which always carry
certain features of the individual rifling characteristics of the firearm. The
analogy is startling, and in fact, a primary reason that the firearms examiner
does not examine handwriting, or vice versa, is that generally he has restricted
himself by not learning the fundamentals of identification. He has yielded
to the popular idea that the human brain is so limited in its capacities that he is
automatically forced into a mold of specialization from which he cannot escape.
This view is not without some merit, but the choice of specialization based on
the evidence examined, rather than on the approach to examination of evidence,
is often tragic in its results.
The true expert witness must know the fundamentals of investigative and
identification method. This is proved day after day in the court room, where the
person who is highly experienced in some very narrow area related to the type
of item that is in evidence, demonstrates that he does not know investigation,
and his efforts may be futile when he is opposed by a person who knows far
less about the specific type of evidence, but is capable of finding the clue that
solves the matter decisively-because he knows basic science and investigative
technique. An illustration is in order.
A repairer of electric blankets testified that he had repaired approximately
a million electric blankets, and was intimately familiar with every type of
electric blanket manufactured. He testified further that the blanket in question
simply could not have been the cause of a fire through shortcircuiting, because
of the numerous safety features built into the blanket alleged to have initiated
the fire. It was further brought out in cross examination that this "expert"
did not know the fundamental physical laws of electricity. The opposing expert,
who had never before carefully examined an electric blanket, but who knew
the principles of electricity and electric circuits was able to demonstrate that
the wiring of this particular blanket deviated from that of the other similar
blankets so well known to the first expert. Furthermore, the error in attaching
the wires allowed the safety features of this blanket to be bypassed, thus making
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a shortcircuit possible, even though it could not happen in the other thousands
of similar blankets. This is the difference between the investigator who utilizes
scientific information to the solution of events, and the highly experienced person
in some limited area who has no investigative knowledge or experience. It must
not be overlooked that unusual events that lead to court action nearly always
involve some deviation from normal-otherwise the unusual event would not
have occurred.
The criteria by which the expert may be selected are simple, and often
not appreciated. First, if scientific principles are involved, the witness must be a
scientist. Technicians, and second rate dabblers in science do not suffice. Second,
and possibly more important, the witness must know investigative procedure
and philosophy. It is in this matter that many competent scientists fail to
meet the requirements. Perhaps investigation is an art. If so, the witness must
be the artist, for science alone cannot always be adapted to the special require-
ments of the matter at issue. Third, the witness must have a working knowledge
of legal procedure if he is to be effective. It is in this requirement also that
many scientists fail, for they do not realize the special requirements of legal,
as opposed to scientific, proof. Furthermore, they are always likely to complicate
or confuse the legal issues by their lack of understanding of legal process and
the manner in which the lawyer approaches his problems. Fourth, the witness
must be capable of reducing his testimony to the level of understandability
by a lay jury who will decide the issue.4 Clear exposition in lay terms may be
effective; complicated technical discussion that is not understood, however
correct, will fall on deaf ears. The requirements for the effective expert witness
are indeed formidable, but they can be met and are met by the properly trained
criminalist. It is equally formidable for the doctor to confront the victim of a
very bad accident, with broken bones, internal injuries and in shock, but proper
training and intellectual discipline on the part of the surgeon allows him to
deal objectively with the complex matter, taking first things first, and skillfully
attending to each thing in its proper order. This approach also characterizes
the skilled expert in the court room, a person who knows the correct approach,
the order of presentation, the ability to sift the decisive from the irrelevant
detail, and to present it clearly and unequivocally to the jury. Such a witness
is reliable, objective, and understands his business. The development of these
skills is the function of criminalistic training.
UTILIZING THE EXPERT
The skill of attorneys in making maximum use of the experts they hire is
extremely variable. If the attorney has some technical or scientific background,
he generally asks the right questions and understands the answers. Lacking
such a background, he may fall into a variety of errors. Some of these may be
illustrated by the following general suggestions:
4. Cf. Souder, Effective Testimony for Scientific Witnesses, 1954 Science 819.
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1. The expert (excluding medical and psychiatric witnesses) 5 must be
given an adequate knowledge of background of the matter at issue, but he is
not concerned with the type of background that is strictly related to individuals,
either principal or witnesses. His concern is with the physical facts and items of
evidence. The background he requires must be of the type that gives a basis
for evaluating the physical facts, and for reconstructing the crime or event.
Eye-witness accounts are generally worthless for these purposes, and may tend
to prejudice the expert. Sometimes there are facts that can be established by
eye witnesses that aid in interpretation. All other such accounts should be ex-
cluded. On the other hand, environmental factors can be critical. For example,
there may be paint chips on the evidence, and they may have vital significance.
However, they may have been present for reasons that are completely unrelated
to the matter at issue. This type of information is critical.
2. The laboratory expert will require standards for comparison. If these
are less than adequate, failures or errors may result. The need is well known
in the matter of document examination, but even here, the standards that are
furnished are very often insufficient to allow a firm expert opinion. The worst
feature of this deficiency is that the expert may not know that the standards are
inadequate, and if he believes them to be, serious errors may result.
The requirement for adequate standards is just as applicable to other forms
of evidence as to documents. Paint chips of unknown origin can only be com-
pared with paint chips of known origin. Evidence glass fragments require that
known glass be made available for comparison. Whatever the type of evidence,
similar items of known origin must be obtained before any meaningful comparison
can be made. In the effort to obtain such standards, the expert may often advise
the attorney or his investigator to good advantage.
3. The expert should be approached in a totally objectiee manner. He is
not an advocate, and should not be influenced toward any opinion that does
not grow out of his own objective investigation. An expert on the witness stand
quickly loses the trust of the court if he appears in any way to be advocating
a cause, rather than merely to be establishing facts on which the court can
reach its own conclusions. Emotional or biased involvement on the part of the
expert with either side of a case inevitably lowers his value.
4. The consultative service of an expert should be freely sought and used
in a broader manner than is customary. In some instances the expert's advice
may even extend into the strictly legal aspects of the case for the reason that
he may have been involved in many more matters of the type in question than
has the attorney, and, if experienced, may know the legal approaches very well.
This advice may very reasonably and profitably be extended to the matter of
questioning in court. Many times, an attorney is so concerned with a particular
5. Special aspects of some of these problems may be explored in Louisell, The Psychol-
ogist in Today's Legal World, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 235 (1955); Diamond, The Fallacy of the
Impartial Expert, Archives of Crim. Psychodynamics, Spring, 1959, p. 221.
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angle of a case, that he tries to push the expert into an unproductive area,
while overlooking other more useful approaches. In addition, the expert will have
his own preferred manner of testifying. To disrupt his approach can have the
effect of rendering his testimony ineffectual. At times, an attorney may not
even know how to qualify a technical expert properly. It is not improper to ask
the expert for his preferred method, and even to take from him a list of questions
to ask, both for qualification and for direct examination. The opposing attorney,
naturally, may be expected to utilize his expert for the purpose of providing
useful lines of cross examination.
5. Guidance by the expert of preliminary or field investigation is often
of the greatest value. It is a fact that most field investigators, especially in
civil matters, are more conscious of people and their statements, than of the
physical evidence and physical facts surrounding the event. Thus, it is common
for the early part of an investigation to be concerned only with locating wit-
nesses, taking statements and similar activities, while the physical evidence be-
comes lost, damaged o1 dissipated. Even when the physical evidence is appre-
ciated and an effort is made to recover it, the methods used are not always
satisfactory, and the evidence may be damaged, lost, or contaminated. In dealing
with this need, the early use of the expert can be of the greatest assistance.
Automobile accident invesigation provides a simple illustration. Car owners
are always anxious to have their automobiles repaired at the earliest possible
time after the accident so that they may have uninterrupted transportation.
Every such vehicle that is repaired before being thoroughly examined is
essentially lost as evidence. Skid marks and other road markings are often
highly critical to reconstructing an accident, but they are subject to erasure by
traffic, and by road repair crews. Thus they should be examined at the earliest
moment by the expert. Similar considerations hold for fire investigation. After
a building that is partially destroyed has been cleared of the fire debris and
residues, and perhaps partially or totally, dismantled, it is no longer of much
value to the investigator. The expert should see it very early, and usually
one or more times during the clean-up process, during which low and deep
burns may be uncovered.
One of the most futile ways to use the expert is to come to him a year or
more after an accident, fire, or other event, with a few witness statements,
perhaps a photograph or two, possibly some automobile repair bills, or similar
inadequate information, and expect him to perform the miracle of recon-
structing and interpreting the entire matter. Although this should never happen,
unfortuifately it is not uncommon.
6. Advisory participation of the expert in the courtroom is sometimes
very useful, and occasionally necessary. It may well be that the attorney will
lack the necessary background to understand completely all of the technical
ramifications in a complex litigation. Having the necessary information at
the proper time is so important that the expert may, to great advantage, be
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made constantly available to the attorney, in or out of the courtroom. Errors
or weakness of an opposing expert's testimony are more likely to be noted by
the technically trained person than by the attorney, and the weight to. be
assigned to such matters may also be better evaluated. Such service is ex-
pensive, and may be effectively duplicated at times by making transcripts avail-
able to the expert at the end of the day. However it is accomplished, there
are many instances in which such interim advice is priceless.
Civn v. CRImINAL LITIGATION
Technical investigation and expert testimony has come to be associated
more with criminal than with civil cases, excepting only those that arise directly
out of a technical background, such as patent litigation. This emphasis on the
criminal investigation stems directly from the maintenance of crime laboratories
by numerous public agencies. It is unfortunate that technical investigation
should be mentally associated only with crime in this way, because both the
methods and the value of such an approach to the civil case are essentially
identical. The laboratory method, added to the investigative skill that is
essential for good criminal investigation is equally valuable for civil investi-
gation. The same type of person can do both if he can do either. There are
few laboratories available for high grade civil investigation as compared with
those whose business it is to investigate crimes. With the development of under-
standing by lawyers and scientists alike of the potentialities and the needs,
this situation may be expected to correct itself in time. Even now, some
crime laboratories allow their personnel to engage in limited civil work, and there
is a slow but significant expansion of private consulting laboratories into
specialization in technical investigation for legal purposes.
It may be considered that the elucidation of demonstrable physical facts
is advantageous to all parties concerned in court actions. Inevitably such
facts will favor one side or the other, but until the facts are available, admin-
istration of justice can be seriously hampered, or totally impaired. Even the
attorney whose hopes are not confirmed by establishment of the facts is -in
better position to reach a favorable settlement or cut his losses if he knows
early that the facts are unfavorable. If his opposition develops these facts
properly, the results are likely to be far more serious for the unprepared at-
torney. Considerations such as these have led some forward looking attorneys
to utilize expert services even when they have reason to believe that they face
an unfavorable factual situation.
THE FUTURE OF T=E LAw-SCIENCE INTERRELATIONSHIP
It is evident that science can contribute greatly to the solution of legal
problems in many directions, and that here lies a fertile field for closer cooper-
ation and coordination. Physical evidence has always been the most reliable
of all forms of evidence, but its full utiliiation has not been regularly achieved.
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In this direction progress is inevitable, and should be more rapid than has been
true in the past. However, to stop here would be a grave error, for the current
rate of scientific accomplishment is so great that it must progressively touch
many more areas of interest to the law. To predict future developments may
be premature, even foolhardy, but as has always been true in science, the
wildest predictions have tended to underestimate the eventual facts.
The outstanding unknown in the entire field of the law is why people
commit crime, and what factors predispose to such commission. Theories
abound to explain the phenomenon, and often the theories conflict because there
is no adequate body of fact to back any of them. The assumption has long
been that facts of the type necessary were limited to the social and behavioral
sciences, and that only from these areas would solutions emerge. This idea is
certainly subject to challenge, because natural science must eventually con-
tribute much of the foundation on which behavioral science must rest.
We say that man is a product of his heredity and his environment. But
heredity depends on the genes which are the subject of an advanced, pro-
gressive, natural science, genetics; and in the term, environment, we must
include internal as well as external environment. The composition of the
blood that nourishes the nerve cells is certainly of as great importance to
behavior as poverty or mother love. Criminality may at times involve some
degree of mental aberration or malfunction, in which proper assessment of
values is not possible, and antisocial acts result. The mind resides in the
nervous system, and mental reactions are conditioned by emotions that result
from various interactions between the glands of internal secretion and the
sympathetic nervous system. Thus, any disease or malfunction of the mind
can be considered to mirror some dysfunction of these systems, just as a meta-
bolic malfunction may result from some impairment of the liver, or a dystrophy
from impairment of the muscle. The plain fact is that the mind is part of
the body, and any malfunction of either will affect the other. Thus, biochem-
istry, physiology, and genetics have a far better chance of clarifying the
predisposing causes and mechanisms of mental aberrations, than do any of
the unaided social sciences. 6
That the above statements are not mere speculation is indicated strongly
by the fact that some forms of one of the more common mental disorders,
schizophrenia, is already believed to be a metabolic disease, since its presence
can be detected by abnormal proteins of the blood, along with other biochem-
6. The facts of biochemical individuality and its implications in the behavioral sciences
has been most thoroughly elucidated by Roger J). Williams, who states, "biochemistry merits
inclusion as one of the most important of the so-called 'behavioral sciences.' Because bio-
chemical individuality points the way toward individuality in the broadest sense of the word,
it has profound implications not only in medicine, psychiatry, and psychology but also in
human relations, education politics and even philosophy." Cf. Encyclopedia of Biological
Sciences (1961); Etiologicai Research in the Light of the Facts of Individuality, 18 Texas
Reports on Biology and Medicine 168 (1960); Berkeley Conference on Personality Develop-
ment in Childhood, The Biological Approach to the Study of Personality (1960).
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ical deviations from normal. The fact that similar physiological disturbances
have not been found to be associated with other mental diseases is at least
partially because insufficient search has been made by other than the super-
ficial methods of psychiatry and behavioral psychology.
The significance to the law of this aspect of the application of science is not
great at this time, because these areas are still somewhat nebulous and poorly
defined. That this situation will persist is unbelievable. Science will inevitably
locate mechanisms, causes and effects of mental aberrations as surely as it
already has for many of the common diseases. When this occurs, the entire
legal concept of such matters as responsibility, insanity, and corrections will
require revision in the light of the new knowledge. This liaison between science
and the law will be far more significant, deeper and stronger than the present
interrelation based only on the assistance that science can provide in matters
concerning physical evidence. It is important that both scientists and lawyers
continue their efforts to u n derstand each other and the fields they represent,
because more and more scientists will inevitably find themselves in the court-
room, and the law will be thereby enriched.
